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A Major Hazard Risk Assessment (MHRA) was developed in 
Australia after a series of mine disasters in the 1990’s.  A MHRA is 
used to help prevent major hazards, i.e. fire, explosion, wind-blast, 
outbursts, spontaneous combustion, roof instability and chemical 
and hazardous substances, from injuring miners. A MHRA is a 
structured process that identifies the characteristics of major 
hazards, assesses and ranks the risk they present, and evaluates 
engineering and administrative controls to mitigate them. These 
controls typically consists of a broad spectrum of prevention, 
monitoring, first response, and emergency response techniques and 
helps to move an operation from a reactive to a proactive approach 
towards safety. 
This paper documents a MHRA performed at an underground 
mine where strata instabilities and fire hazards may threaten the 
condition of its escapeways.  The objective of this MHRA is to 1) 
identify what hazards could affect the egress through the mine’s 
escapeways, 2) determine what unwanted events pose the greatest 
threat for the mine, and 3) recommend a plan to prevent or recover 
from the potential disruption of egress through the escapeway. The 
plan provides information on the key existing controls that should 
be monitored and audited, and makes recommendation of new 
potential controls to further reduce related risks. By documenting 
the use of MHRA to this specific ground control issue, this paper 
provides a framework for others to judge the merits of this 
approach and to help design and perform these activities. 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent mining disasters have focused attention on the need to 
improve how major hazards, the kind that are associated with 
multiple fatalities in underground mines, are assessed and managed. 
The Australia minerals industry began their movement towards 
risk-based management systems in the mid-1990’s, shortly after the 
Moura coal mine explosion in 1994 fatally injured 11 miners 
(Hopkins, 2000). As a result, industry began using risk analysis 
methods to mitigate certain key hazards. Later, the various 
regulatory bodies in Australia began to mandate safety 
management plans for principal hazards.  In New South Wales, the 
Chief Inspector of Coal Mines (NSWDPI, 1997) published a risk 
management handbook that offers a process to anticipate and 
prevent circumstances which may result in occupational injury or 
death.  Queensland followed (QDME, 1998 and QMC, 1999) with 
it own standard. These regulations require mines to perform Major 
Hazard Risk Assessments (MHRAs) on a regular basis to address 
the possibility of unwanted events like spontaneous combustion, 
gas outbursts, explosions, air blasts, inundations and roof falls. The 
Australian underground mining industry now is realizing some of 
the lowest fatality injury rates in the world, even lower than that of 
the U.S. (table 1). The National Institute for Occupational Safety 
and Health (NIOSH) has undertaken a pilot project to evaluate 
MHRA potential for US mines through a series of case studies 
across several mining sectors. The purpose is to validate the use of 
this technique and to identify obstacles to its successful 
implementation in the U.S. mining industry. This case study 
examines the roof instability hazard and provides an example as to 
how MHRA could help to mitigate risk. 
Table 1.  Average fatality rates for underground mining in U.S. 
and Australia from 2004 to 2006 based on the number 
of fatal injuries per 1 million hours worked. 
Commodity Avg. fatality rate 
U.S. Coal 0.25 
Metal/nonmetal 0.14 
Australia Coal 0.04 
Metalliferous 0.07 
The general conditions found at the study site are shown in 
figure 1. The part of the mine that comprises the study area was 
mined over 40 years ago using the room-and-pillar technique. 
Large rooms were driven 45 ft (13.7 m) wide and 30 ft (9.1 m) high 
perpendicular to a highwall in an adjacent quarry and off-set cross-
cuts of the same size were mined typically on 90 ft (27.4 m) centers. 
The parallel Primary and Alternate Escapeways run southeast from 
Portals No.1 and 2 to inby portions of the mine. In January 1994, a 
roof collapse occurred in an area adjacent to the Alternate 
Escapeway about 250 ft (76.2 m) from Portal No.2. Between 
January 1994 and December 2006, other roof falls have occurred to 
the southwest of the Alternate Escapeway, resulting in a large 
restricted area shown in figure 1. Management has responded to 
this roof instability hazard through best-practice controls, including 
roof monitoring, supplemental standing support and tensioned 









l l Portal 2
Mine Representatives 
Surface Quarry  
Mine Manager 
Mine Engineer 




Escapeway Safety Officer 
 
Facilitators (Risk Assessment Experts) 
Jan. 94 
Roof Fall Experts (Field of Expertise) 
Restricted  
Area Ground Control Engineers
Feb. 07 
Roof Ventilation Engineer 

Cracks Mining Regulation Specialist 

Mine Evacuation Specialist 







The Assessment Framework: The Scoping Team agreed toRoof Cracks
frame the assessment by limiting it to the Primary and Alternate 
Escapeways when egress was disrupted by a roof collapse or fire 
hazard.  Normal ventilation operating conditions were considered, 
Figure 1. Escapeways, roof falls and recent roof cracks found which means the fan at the ventilation shaft is either exhausting or 
at the mine. blowing into the mine. During exhaust conditions both escapeways 
are in fresh air, while under blowing conditions the escapeways  
 Recently, roof conditions in the escapeways showed signs of will be in return air.  A time period of five years was used for considering hazards and risks.deterioration.  Of particular concern are the January, 2007 roof fall 
and the January/February, 2007 appearance of intermittent, en 
echelon roof cracks (figure 1).  One of these roof cracks is IDENTIFY HAZARDS THAT AFFECT EGRESSespecially troublesome because it extends across the Alternate 

UGH THE MINE’S ESCAPEWAYS




 Hazards that affect egress through the mine’s escapeways are 
The objective of the MHRA is to: identified by first dividing the escapeway system into logical 
segments and then analyzing the various types of hazards. 
 
 Segments of the Escapeway System: For the purposes of this 
analysis, the description of a metal/nonmetal escapeway follows 
from the definitions cited in the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 
30, Section 57.11050 (CFR, 2005). The escapeway system at the 
study mine are subdivided into six segments (figure 2). 
Surface Quarry
1. Identify hazards that could affect egress through the mine’s 
escapeways, 
2. Determine what unwanted events pose the greatest threat for 
the mine, and 
3. Recommend a plan to prevent, or recover from, potential 
disruption of escapeway egress. 
 
 




 The initial MHRA steps consist of scoping document 
generation, scoping team selection and assessment framework 3identification. 2
 
 The Scoping Document: A scoping document identifies the 4
MHRA tasks.  First, major hazards associated with egress through 
Primary and Alternate Escapeways during an emergency at mine 
should be reviewed. Consequences associated with the unwanted 
event are investigated and the likelihood of the event occurring LEGEND 5should be estimated.  Threats that disrupt egress through the Primary escapeway
escapeway are to be analyzed and ranked using a risk matrix 
technique.  Finally, existing and new controls and recovery Alternate escapeway
measures will be identified. 6 Segment number 6 
 The Scoping Team:  The scoping team consisted of the 
following persons: 
 









 Rib instability 
Degree of hazards Roof Fall Risk Index (RFRI) variations 
Rock reinforcement and room spans 
variations 
Diesel equipment – truck, front end loader, backhoe, 
grader, crane, scoops and other smaller pieces of diesel 
equipment 
Fuel Storage – diesel tanks and other flammable 
materials 





Other Equipment and Storage – conveyor belt, natural 
gas pipe line, wood, PVC pipe, and other minor 
amounts of material 
Overheating of diesel equipment, electrical equipment 
and electrical cabling 

















Likelihood (event occurs in next 5 years)
Consequence 
Certain Very Likely Likely Unlikely Very Unlikely 
High Impact 1 2 4 7 11 
Moderate impact 3 5 8 12 16 
Low impact 6 9 13 17 20 
No impact 10 14 18 21 23 
Hazards:  A hazard is a source of potential harm with the 
potential to cause loss -- an uncontrolled exchange of energy 
(Standards Australia, 2004). The two kinds of hazards investigated 
in this study are fire and roof collapse.  Fire hazards are identified 
by considering potential fuel and ignition sources. The results are 
summarized in Table 2.  Roof instability hazards are considered 
only in terms of their potential to block egress through escapeways. 
Small roof falls that can result in injuries were therefore excluded 
from the analysis, since they do not block egress. 
Table 2.  Fire hazards consisting of potential fuel and ignition 
sources. 
 
Figure 3. Roof fall risk index (RFRI) measured in the mine’s 
escapeways. 
DETERMINE WHICH UNWANTED EVENTS POSE 

THE GREATEST THREAT 

The hazard assessment followed a structured process which 
relies extensively on qualitative risk analysis methods. After the 
scoping team is familiar with the escapeway routes, current ground 
conditions, ventilation and operational requirements, the risk for a 
potential unwanted event in each segment are determined. The risk 
associated with unwanted events are rated using the Broad Brush 
Risk Assessment (BBRA) method which considers the likelihood 
and consequences of each event. 
A NIOSH developed tool, called the Roof Fall Risk Index 
(RFRI), was used to systematically identify roof fall hazards in the 
escapeways. The RFRI is a hazard assessment technique that maps 
Table 3.  Roof and rib hazards capable of blocking 
the spatial distribution of stability conditions. The RFRI focuses on 
the character and intensity of defects associated with specific roof 
conditions (Iannacchione et al., 2006; Iannacchione, et al., 2007). 
Ideally, values approaching 0 represent safer roof conditions, while 
an RFRI approaching 100 represents a serious roof fall hazard.  The 
RFRI values for the mine’s escapeway system are shown in 
figure 3.  Higher values indicate increasing risk of roof collapse in 
the absence of additional roof stabilization efforts. For example, 
escapeway egress. 
Broad Brush Risk Assessment: The scoping team identified 28the relative roof fall risk in Segment 1 of the Primary Escapeway is 
potentially lower than Section 2 because this section contains roof 
bolts, wire mesh and narrower entry spans. 
potential unwanted events based on the defined list of hazards 
(tables 2 and 3). Each potential unwanted event was risk-ranked 
using a qualitative risk analysis method (table 4). Lower numbers 
indicate a higher risk. The likelihood of an event was subjectively 
assessed by considering the probability of the event occurring in 
the next five years.  The consequences of an event were assessed by 
Table 4. A 4 by 5 risk matrix for ranking the unwanted events. 
Table 5.  Risk ranking of unwanted events grouped by escapeway segment. 
Escapeway 
Segment Potential unwanted event 
Consequence 
(impact) 
Likelihood (next 5 
years) Risk ranking 
Equipment fire – fan exhausting High Unlikely 7 
1 
Equipment fire – fan blowing Moderate Unlikely 8 
Roof collapse High Very Unlikely 11 
Diesel storage fire – fan exhausting High Very Unlikely 11 
Diesel storage fire – fan blowing Moderate Very Unlikely 16 
Roof collapse High Likely 4 
2 Equipment fire - fan exhausting High Very Unlikely 11 
Equipment fire – fan blowing High Very Unlikely 11 
Electrical Cable fire Low Very Unlikely 18 
Equipment fire – fan exhausting High Unlikely 7 
Equipment fire – fan blowing Moderate Unlikely 12 
Charging station fire – fan exhausting High Likely 4 
Charging station fire – fan blowing Moderate Likely 8 
3 Transformer fire – fan exhausting Low Unlikely 16 
Transformer fire – fan blowing Low Unlikely 16 
Natural gas leak explosion High Very Unlikely 11 
Flammable storage cabinet catches fire Low Very Unlikely 20 
Roof collapse High Very Likely 2 
Equipment fire – fan exhausting High Very Unlikely 11 
4 Equipment fire – fan blowing High Very Unlikely 11 
Roof collapse Moderate Very Likely 5 
Equipment fire – fan exhausting High Unlikely 7 
5 Equipment fire – fan blowing Moderate Unlikely 12 
Roof collapse Moderate Unlikely 12 
Transformer catches fire Low Very Unlikely 20 
6 
Equipment fire during travel – fan exhausting Low Very Unlikely 18 
Equipment fire during travel – fan blowing Low Very Unlikely 18 
Roof collapse Low Unlikely 16 
considering its potential impact on the ability to evacuate the mine 
in case of an emergency.  This included consideration of blockage 
of escapeway routes and the spread of toxic fumes or smoke. Both 
exhaust and blowing ventilation scenarios were considered. The 
inability to use either escapeway for egress from the mine during an 
emergency was considered to be the highest impact consequence. 
The results of the risk rating exercise are summarized in table 5. 
EVALUATING THE CONTROLS AND RECOVERY

MEASURES FOR THE TOP UNWANTED EVENTS

The top four unwanted events identified through the BBRA are 
selected for further analysis. 
1. Roof collapse in Primary Escapeway of Segment 3 
2. Charging station fire in Primary Escapeway of Segment 3 
3. Roof collapse in Alternate Escapeway of Segment 2 
4. Roof collapse in Alternate Escapeway of Segment 4 
The Bow Tie Analysis (BTA) is an excellent method for 
identifying both existing and new control and recovery measures 
for these highest risk events. 
The Bow Tie Analysis 
The BTA was developed by Shell Oil in the 1980’s as part of 
their Tripod package of concepts and tools for managing 
occupational health and safety in their business.  It is important to 
note that the “Top Event” in the BTA is not the full event 
considered in the BBRA but rather a statement about the initiating 




















Figure 4. Bow Tie Analysis method. 
The team discussed the nature and quality of the prevention a. Existing prevention control measures:  The following are 
controls as part of the BTA.  Threats (also referred to as potential the key controls, currently in place, for the highest risks 
causes) were discussed and controls examined that could mitigate unwanted events.  These existing control measures should 
the hazard (left side of the bow-tie).  Next, the consequences (also be reinforced, monitored and audited with priority. 
referred to as the potential outcomes) of the initiating unwanted Controls for roof collapse hazards consisted of 6 and 8 ft 
event were identified and recovery control measures examined to (1.8 and 2.4 m) grouted bolts on 5 ft (1.5 m) centers; 
reduce or minimize the loss (right side of the bow-tie). The scaling every 3 to 6 months or as needed; periodic 
outcomes of the bowtie analysis are presented in table 6 and observation of roof conditions, roof monitoring; cable bolt 
summarized below: support with wire mesh; and breaker wall standing support 
between the Alternate Escapeway and the restricted area. 
Fire hazard controls consists of weekly battery checks. 
Table 6.  Controls and recovery measures for top unwanted events that impact escapeway egress. 









Threat 1 - Roof collapse 
in Primary Escapeway 
Segment 3 
Primary support – 6 and 8 ft (1.8 and 2.4 m) grouted bolts 
Scale roof and ribs every 3 to 6 months, or as needed 
Random observation of roof conditions 
NEW IDEAS(1):  Immediately implement a regularly scheduled roof conditions visual 
observation plan 
NEW IDEAS(2):  Design and install a monitoring system for roof crack and roof sag 
detection 
NEW IDEAS(3):  Design a method of stabilizing the roof in this area based on the 
information gathered from the roof monitoring program 
NEW IDEAS(4):  Consider stabilizing the adjacent Alternate Escapeway (Segment 4) to act 
as a buffer for securing this area 
Threat 2 - Charging 
station fire in Primary 
Escapeway Segment 3 
Battery water levels and terminals are checked weekly 
NEW IDEAS(5):  Place charging station outside mine 
Threat 3: Roof collapse in 
Alternate Escapeway 
Segment 2 
Monitoring with multipoint extensometers 
Cable bolt support with steel screen 
Observation of roof conditions 
Breaker wall standing support 
NEW IDEAS(6):  Develop a trigger action response plan (TARP) for roof movement that 
will initiate additional rock reinforcement installation 
NEW IDEAS(7):  Repair/replace existing multipoint extensometers 
Threat 4 - Roof collapse 
in Alternate Escapeway 
Segment 4 
Scale roof and ribs every 3 to 6 months, or as needed 
Random observation of roof conditions 
Monitor microseismic emissions from the mine (just begun) 
NEW IDEAS(2): see above 
NEW IDEAS(3): see above 











Consequence 1 – Roof 
collapse blocks the 
Primary Escapeway 
NEW IDEAS(9):  Consider installing refuge chambers in the active work areas 
NEW IDEAS(10):  Consider using the ventilation shaft as an Alternate Escape route 
Consequence 2 – 
Charging Station Fire in 
Primary Escapeway 
Station is partially enclosed by a cinder block wall and metal roof 
Scoop has fire suppression system 
Fire extinguishers are present, although current policy is to evacuate rather than fight fire 
Main office is contacted via radio 
Use radios to communicate fire alarm to everyone underground 
Sound the siren 
Life lines exist in part of the Primary Escapeway 
NEW IDEAS(11):  Install backup generator for communication system 
NEW IDEAS(12):  Install fire detection/suppression systems on large diesel equipment 
NEW IDEAS(13):  All personnel and visitors to wear SCSRs (training needed) 
NEW IDEAS(14):  Close down charging station when the general public is underground 
NEW IDEAS(15):  Finish installing life line in all escapeways 
Consequence 3 - Roof 
collapse blocks the 
Alternate Escapeway 
NEW IDEAS(9 & 10): see above 
Consequence 4 - Roof 
collapse blocks Alternate 
Escapeway 
NEW IDEAS(9 & 10): see above 
 
b. 	Existing recovery measures:  The existing recovery 
measures for a large roof collapse, capable of blocking the 
Primary or Alternate Escapeways consist of developing 
new escapeway routes or rehabilitating the roof fall area.  If 
a fire occurred in the charging station area, a cinder block 
wall and metal roof could partially contain the fire.  Fire 
extinguishers are present in this area, although current 
policy is to evacuate rather than fight the fire.  Several 
pieces of diesel equipment have fire suppression systems. 
In the event of an evacuation, radio communication, 
directed by the mine office, would be used to communicate 
a fire alarm.  A site wide siren is also available. Lastly, life 
lines exist in part of the Primary Escapeway. 
c.	 Potential new prevention controls:  Fifteen new control 
ideas were identified.  These new controls are aimed at 
either the roof collapse or fire hazard.  For the roof collapse 
hazards, new controls are divided into three groups: 
administrative, monitoring and engineering. An 
administrative control in the form of a policy could restrict 
personnel access to the Alternate Escapeway except in an 
emergency situation.  A number of monitoring controls 
were discussed including: a regularly scheduled visual 
observation plan of roof conditions; installation of 
additional roof and crack monitors and a trigger action 
response plan (TARP) for monitors.  New ideas for 
preventing roof collapse hazards include a supplemental 
rock reinforcement program for segment 3 of the Primary 
Escapeway and a stabilization design for segment 4 of the 
Alternate Escapeway.  The new control for the fire hazard 
was to place the charging station outside the mine. 
d. 	Potential new recovery measures:  Several new recovery 
measures were identified.  To mitigate the impact of a roof 
collapse, the existing ventilation shaft could be used as an 
Alternate Escapeway.  Also, a rescue chamber could be 
installed in active work areas. New ideas to help recover 
from the fire hazard included using a backup generator for 
the communication system; installation of additional fire 
detection/suppression systems; elevated Personal Protective 
Equipment requirements; limited charging station use; and 
install life lines in all escapeways. 
Action Plan:  These new control and recovery measure ideas 
should be addressed through the development of an Action Plan. 
The Action Plan with the ideas inserted and space left for 
derivation of specific actions, timing and resourcing is provided in 
table 7. 
DISCUSSION 
The attributes of this process are many.  It helps to utilize the 
strengths of a team of experts familiar with the hazards being 
addressed.  Risk analysis methods are used to focus the team on the 
highest ranked risk and to analyze these risks in a structured 
manner.  The mine’s current control and recovery measures are 
identified so that they can be monitored and audited.  New potential 
control and recovery measures are produced for consideration by 
management.  These new ideas are easily listed in the form of an 
action plan.  The plan can then be delivered to management for 
prioritization and implementation. 
A weakness in this approach has to do with the expectation that 
a specific design will be a direct outcome of the activity.  Detailed 
designs are not easily accomplished in a MHRA exercise. 
Table 7.  Example of an action plan for the new ideas developed by the scoping team. 
Identified Potential New Controls Specific Required Actions Responsibility Due date 
1) Immediately implement a regularly scheduled roof conditions 
visual observation plan 
2) Design and install a monitoring system for roof crack and roof 
sag detection 
3) Design a method of stabilizing the roof in this area based on 
the information gathered from the roof monitoring program 
4) Consider stabilizing the adjacent Alternate Escapeway 
(Segment 4) to act as a buffer for securing this area 
5) Place charging station outside mine 
6) Develop a trigger action response plan (TARP) for roof 
movement that will initiate additional rock reinforcement 
installation 
7) Repair/replace existing multipoint extensometers 
8) Develop a policy to restrict access except in an emergency 
situation 
9) Consider installing refuge chambers in the active work areas 
10) Consider using the ventilation shaft as an Alternate Escape 
route 
11) Install backup generator for communication system 
13) Install fire detection/suppression systems on large diesel 
equipment 
14) Close down charging station when the general public is 
underground 
15) Finish installing life line in all escapeways 
SUMMARY 
This paper provided a case study example as to how the MHRA 
approach, as practiced in Australia, might be used to mitigate the 
risk of roof instability and fire hazards in US underground mines. 
The major threats to escapeway egress are identified as well as an 
inventory of existing controls and recovery measures specific to 
each threat.  New ideas are presented in an action plan for 
management consideration.  All this is accomplished in a structured, 
group-oriented activity designed to produce a written report. 
MHRA promotes a more proactive approach to dealing with a 
mine’s major hazards. 
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